Page 71 - EMCAPP-Journal No. 13

existence (even if t was a cloned one!) different be adressed as imago Dei and stands for what
or singular compared to another? Anyway, the- cannot be explained as the result of any physical
re is a subjective aspect as an individualistic ex- (i.e. sensory) influence. This embodied but not
perience of being oneself. This is nothing less physically caused cognition as part of human
than the physically and philosophically hard selfawareness has to be developed in a lifetime
problem of consciousness. Here Hathaway fi- process.
nally comes in with the thought of embodied
cognition which connects to different embo- Hathaway’s essay gives an inspiring overview
died mind theories (Shapiro; Lakoff; Gibson, on the very core of christian anthropology and
Baron-Cohn). The result of all seems to be, that leads the readers view from traditionally prefor-
there is no absolute human mind but a mindset med ideas to a more and more open horizon in-
that is formed by different physical functions cluding all the aspects of modern philosophical
and interactions. But still there remains a re- and neuroscientific theories. Though the final
sidual unit of human cosciousness which can conclusion is a bit disappointing (or at least not
that spectacular) the whole discussion gives a
positive approach to an imago Dei based and in
the same time developmentally orientated chri-
stian anthropology which can be very helpful
also in psychotherapeutic concerns. As a first
step ahead the imago Dei concept could serve
as an open process of defining each individual’s
own self in the image of the creator. Therefore
Hathaway’s discourse could be the beginning of
further interdisciplinary considerations.

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