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type” (p. 19). capacities, and second, that these individual
A major part of the case for Christians reposi- sensorimotor capacities are themselves embed-
tioning theological anthropology on physicali- ded in a more encompassing biological, psy-
stic grounds has been the supposed success of chological and cultural context” (pp. 172–173).
neuroscience in thus explaining consciousness. The embodied mind thesis has been developed
Yet now key pioneers in the search for the neu- in multiple domains of psychological science
ral correlates of consciousness, such as Koch or including the psychology of language and the
Chalmers, have viewed the physicalist paradigm field of perception studies. A classic debate in
as inadequate to explain the hard problems of the psychology and philosophy of language over
consciousness. They have increasingly moved how language and thought are related (Shapiro,
to positions such as panpsychism although 2011). Does language depend on thought, vice
some prominent neuroscientists have long versa, or are they perhaps independent systems?
embraced dualism as part of their explanatory The embodied thesis in linguistics more closely
framework (e.g. Penfield, Eccles). Given this, is connects thought and language to sensorimo-
there not prima facie justification for a return tor aspects of our knowledge. Lakoff, trained by
to a Christian anthropology that explores the Chomsky from a cognitivist framework, came
implications of a neuroscientifically informed to reject that cognitivist perspective because of
philosophy of mind that holds the modal me- the extent to which our thought is shaped by
taphysical ontology of historic Christianity as a our bodily existence (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).
live option? The traditional idea that only a sub- For instance, our images of being in control fre-
set of substances, identified here in a rough and quently reference the one in control being in the
ready way as spiritual substance, is inherently upward relation (i.e., “I’m on it” or “He’s under
minded. Why would not this common idea my control”). Research has provided support
from Christian thought solve the hard problem for the embodiment thesis but not invariant-
of consciousness, explaining from whence ari- ly so. Galetzka (2017) notes fMRI studies that
ses the ground of conscious awareness? Further seeing action words produce corresponding
would it not do so without committing to a activations in the pre-motor and motor areas
counterintuitive notion that all matter may be without actual movements. Yet this motor area
conscious. If humans do consist of a minded activation is not always present when motoric
or protominded substance in close combina- metaphors or idioms are used. Aziz-Zadeh and
tion with material body, despite the embodied Damasio (2008) suggest that when motor meta-
intermingling of those two ontological catego- phors become very familiar they may be repre-
ries into a unified experiencer fueled by bodily sented in different brain areas from the sensori-
influences, then what might this say about how motor areas more implicated in novel exposure.
we possess the imago Dei? In the field of perception psychology, top-down
models have emphasized the constructive na-
Embodied Cognition: Substance, Function, ture of perception that shape our sensory inputs
Relation & Telos into meaningful percepts based on cognitive
Cognitivism has held sway in cognitive science processes such as primed schemas or expectan-
for decades. This is the view the human mind cies. A distinct tradition emphasizes how the
works as an information processing system si- sensory system determines perception in direct
milarly to how a computer does (Galetza, 2017). contact with the world from the bottom up.
In recent decades, an alternative paradigm to Gibson’s (1966, 2015/1979) ecological model of
cognitivism has begun to take shape in psy- perception represents such an approach. Taking
chology. It is referred to as the embodied mind inspiration from 18th century philosopher Tho-
thesis. Rosch, Thompson, and Varela (1992) ex- mas Reid, Gibson defended direct realism about
plain: “By using the term embodied we mean at least some sense perceptions. He argued that
to highlight two points: first that cognition de- constructivism placed too much emphasis on
pends upon the kinds of experience that come the mental and not enough on the constraints
from having a body with various sensorimotor of the environment in shaping our perceptions.

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