Page 60 - EMCAPP-Journal No. 13
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say that humans are relational beings, and that   advanced  in  Thomistic,  Cartesian  interactive,
             is what it means to be human (made to relate to   holistic, and emergent forms (Cortez, 2010).
             God, to each other, and to the rest of creation).   While  dualism  has  fallen  out  of  favor  in  the
             But the ontological question of what a human      post-Darwinian and current neuroscience era
             is constituted of is different and gets little to no   for  many  scientists  and  academics,  most  phi-
             explicit attention in the theological flow of the   losophical rejection of dualism has been aimed
             Biblical imago Dei texts (even if a certain me-   at  its  Cartesian  varieties  (Churchhouse,  2017,
             taphysical  view  would  be  assumed).  In  effect,   Cortez,  2010,  Damasio,  1994).  The  common-
             imago Dei studies (from within the wider fra-     sense  intuition  that  we  are  both  mental  and
             mework of Genesis 1 and 2) are addressing the     physical  has  been  a  large  factor  in  support
             questions ‘who’ and ‘why’ is humanity. Human      dualism’s  enduring  appeal  in  traditional  and
             constitution is addressing the question of ‘what’   folk thought. Biblical and theoretical critiques
             is humanity… (p. 283).                            of dualism have also claimed dualism assumes
             The ontological question will be addressed be-    a faulty view of the mental life. The stereotypic
             low to position the metaphysical framework for    view of dualism attacked by its critics shares the
             introducing the relevance of embodied cogniti-    following tenets: the mind and body are distinct
             on studies to our thought about the imago Dei.    types  of  substances  that  causally  interact;  the
             Surveys of anthropological ontologies in theo-    mind is the seat of consciousness, not the body;
             logy usually describe three basic views on the    conscious thought can occur without the body;
             issue:  trichotomism,  dualism  and  monism       personal identity (i.e., that which defines and
             (Boyd & Eddy, 2002, Dorman, 2001, Erickson,       makes  a  person  the  same  person  across  time
             2013,  Feinberg,  2017).  Trichotomism  is  noti-  and space) does not depend on the body, and
             on that humans consist of three substances or     the conscious mind is a characteristic of the im-
             other ontological categories: a physical body, a   material soul.
             psychological/mental  soul,  and  an  immaterial   Against  such  a  view,  Yong  (2007)  emphasizes
             spirit. On these models, animals and humans       the holistic and embodied presentation of hu-
             are often both thought to share soulish qualities   manity  in  Genesis  and  views  it  at  odds  with
             differing in some instances only by degree. Yet   the fragmented view of the person he sees in
             any third component, most often identified as     dualism thus raising the common anti-dualist
             the spirit, is frequently asserted to be a unique   problem  of  embodiment.  Other  challenges
             attribute of humanity among earthly creatures.    for  stereotypic  dualism  include  the  problem
             Dualism  sees  spirit  and  soul  as  roughly  syn-  of interaction (how can a non-material/ non-
             onymous, both referring to the immaterial part    temporal/ non-spatial substance interact with a
             of persons, and the body as the material part.    material one extended in space-time), and the
             Dualism  has  been  the  predominant  theologi-   „mind of the gaps“ problem (Lavazza & Robin-
             cal view throughout most of Christian history     son, 2016). This latter problem arises from the
             (Erickson,  2013).  Monism  holds  that  that  we   growing success of neuroscience in explaining
             exist as unitary physical beings. The soul/spirit   various features and processes of cognition in
             is a property or characteristic or function of the   terms of biocognitive process. For instance, fin-
             body not a separate substance or element.         dings such at the localization of specific men-
             These  theological  views  often  are  approached   tal faculties or features to specific brain areas
             both philosophically, engaging perennial issu-    make plausible a reduction of the former to the
             es in philosophy of mind, and through exege-      latter for are large swath of cognitive scientists
             tical  treatments  that  attempt  to  demonstrate   (Churchland, 2013).
             which view most aligns with Biblical theology     The momentum of reductive naturalism in neu-
             (Moreland, 2009, 2014; Moreland & Rae, 2000;      roscience, psychology and other fields has been
             Robinson, 1952). It should also be noted that     reflected in the shift away from dualism in re-
             the three-category classification of these theo-  cent centuries among scholars of various fields.
             logical ontologies conflates a number of distinct   But despite its unfashionable current standing,
             perspectives.  For  instance,  dualism  has  been   influential defenses of varieties of dualism con-

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