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tinue to be mounted in philosophy (Lavazza &      From Swinburne, I had come to appreciate the
             Robinson, 2016), philosophical theology (Mo-      cogency  of  arguments  against  reductionism
             reland, 2009, Moreland & Rae, 2000, Swinbur-      even  in  this  age  of  neuroscience.  From  the
             ne, 2013), and theology (Cooper, 2000; Loftin &   debate, I learned how connected are issues of
             Farris, 2018).                                    post-death survival of the person and the stand
             Many contemporary  defenses  of  dualism  take    one  takes  on  human  constitution.  As  Cooper
             pains to distinguish themselves from the Carte-   (2000) has passionately argued, monistic phy-
             sian stereotype in favor of what Cooper (2000)    sicalism has great difficulty accounting for an
             calls a holistic dualism. Cooper argues that “a   intermediate state of persons after death. While
             holistic-dualistic anthropology is not obviously   some Christian monists have attempted to ar-
             incompatible with the findings of establishment   gue  that  forms  of  non-reductive  physicalism
             science or with various contemporary approa-      are not defeated by the problem of personali-
             ches to philosophy” (n.p.). Similarly, Erickson   ty  identity  (viz.,  Murphy,  2006),  this  remains
             (2013) concludes that “The full range of the Bib-  a point of contention (Loftin & Farris, 2018).
             lical data can best be accommodated by the view   Issues of personal identity may also be a chal-
             that we will term “conditional unity.” According   lenge  even  for  monists  that  allow  for  resur-
             to this view, the normal state of a human is as an   rection.  Consider  the  following  hypothetical:
             embodied unitary being. In Scripture humans       imagine that a clone of Jones was created while
             are so addressed and regarded. …this monistic     Jones is still living. In this case, the clone me-
             condition can, however, be broken down, and       thod allowed a clone to be made with the same
             at death it is, so that the immaterial aspect of   phenomenal field, memories, apparent age, and
             the human lives on even as the material” (n.p.).   otherwise  identical  appearing  body  up  to  the
             Even those defending contemporary varieties of    moment  of  the  clone’s  creation.  Imagine  also
             Cartesian substance dualism (viz., Swinburne,     that clone was made while the Jones was under
             2013) allow for holistic emphases about the hu-   general anesthesia. Now its just so happens that
             man person.                                       both the original Jones and the clone of Jones
             In the mid-1980’s, I was able to set up a debate   (e,g.,  c-Jones)  became  conscious  in  the  room
             on the mortality of the soul between a visiting   simultaneously without any indication of who
             professor, Antony Flew, and Richard Swinbur-      was Jones and who was c-Jones. Through a mis-
             ne  for  the  philosophy  department  at  Bowling   hap of process, even the inventors had no way
             Green State University. Both had given Gifford    of knowing. Both believe themselves to be Jones
             lectures that decade from opposing perspecti-     but which of the two now is Jones?
             ves:  Swinburne  advocated  a  dualist  view  that   Would  not  any  model  of  personality  identity
             argued the soul continues past death and Flew     that equates personal identity with some func-
             defended an atheistic perspective that denied a   tional mental state (i.e, continuity of memory)
             soul distinct from the body that could survive    or pattern of relationship, or other such functio-
             death. In 2007, Flew published a text that made   nal states or patterns be incapable of providing
             media  headlines,  reporting  that  after  years  of   an answer? A materialist might argue that they
             prominently defending atheism, he now belie-      are not the same person only because they did
             ved in a God along deist or Aristotelian lines. In   not both possess the same physical body that
             a personal conversation, shortly after the book’s   was the body of Jones prior to the cloning (alt-
             publication,  Flew  informed  me  that  although   hough no one may now be able to tell the real
             he had come to believe that an intelligent agent   Jones  from  c-Jones).  Non-reductive  physica-
             had a hand in the creation of the universe, he    lists, such as Murphy (2006), have often argued
             continued to believe in the mortality of the soul.   that  it  is  some  group  of  emergent  functional
             While some had uncharitably charged that Flew     properties that make a person who they are and
             was just trying to purchase afterlife fire insuran-  not a continuity of substance. This allows them
             ce as he was getting on in years, Flew quipped    to  make  a  case  that  their  form  of  monism  is
             it would do no good since he did not believe he   compatible with Christian ideas of survival past
             would survive death.                              death through resurrection. Yet in our example,

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