Page 16 - EMCAPP-Journal No. 23

thoughts, feelings and behaviors in our daily lives” vironmental and interpersonal factors that affect
(2019, p. 1).
Following is a deepening discussion on two
perspec�ves, based on the work of a historic philo-
sopher and that of current mo�va�onal resear-
chers, that reviews how mo�va�on can move one
toward the “chief human good” (p. 3), or toward a
lesser direc�on. From a Biblical perspec�ve, we be-
lieve that God is our chief good (Mark 10:18), His
original crea�on in Genesis was very good (Genesis
1:31), and that the “dark”ness men�oned above
came with the fall of mankind (Genesis 3).
Further Development of Eudaimonic-Based Mo�-
va�onal Well-Being
th
Aristotle (4 Century B.C.E./2019) defines eudai-
monia as the chief human good; “a certain sort of
ac�vity of the soul in accord with virtue” (p.14) and Demian Whi�ng (2020) introduces a philosophical
excellence that is lived out with modera�on and re-
ason. Ryff & Singer go on to emphasize that “virtue
for Aristotle was a state of character concerned
with choice in which deliberate ac�ons are taken to
avoid excess or deficiency” (2008, p. 16). Biblically ”A standard view in metaphysics has it that objects
there is alignment with Ecclesiastes 7:18: “It is good are disposed to behave in the ways they do in vir-
to grasp the one and not let go of the other. Whoe-
ver fears God will avoid all extremes” (New Interna-
�onal Version, 1978/2011).
In “Clarifying eudaimonia and psychological func�-
oning to complement evalua�ve and experien�al
well-being: Why basic psychological needs should
be measured in na�onal account of well-being”
(Martella & Ryan, 2023), it was proposed that a
third category of need-based sa�sfac�on be inclu-
ded, in addi�on to experien�al well-being and eva-
lua�ve well-being. According to Martella & Ryan,
there is a need to broaden understanding and to
empirically strengthen the psychological func�o-
ning aspect beyond life sa�sfac�on. They go on to
emphasize a key part of this assessment is conside-
ra�on of the Aristotelian concepts of meaning and
purpose in life, or “eudaimonic well-being” which is
seen to be more about ac�vity (virtues) and… “a
way of living rather than a feeling” (p. 1125).
In 2017, Ryan and Deci summarized their efforts in
their seminal work, Self-determina�on theory: Ba-
sic psychological needs in mo�va�on, develop-
ment, and wellness. With their “social-psychologi-
cal focus; they promote first, “social contexts to
support engagement, vitality, thriving, and ascend-
ant human func�oning”. Second, they specify “en-
16
16
people’s mo�va�on, well-being, and performance.”
They hope to promote “greater awareness of pro-
cesses that affect everyone and accordingly, allow
them to make the choices and engage in the ac-
�ons that cons�tute a more eudaimonic life”. Of
cri�cal importance is considera�on of the human
autonomic capacity for mindfulness/“reflec�ve
awareness”; which empowers the opportunity for
ac�ve choice making, improved need sa�sfac�on,
capacity “to care for others, and builds a fuller and
more meaningful existence” (p. 647). Though Ryan
et al., had completed research on Chris�an intrinsic
and extrinsic mo�va�on (1993), both Ryan and
Deci present their work from a secular perspec�ve.
Philosophical Perspec�ve on Mo�va�on
thought that is meaningful to this concept of mo�-
va�on. He sees that all things behave according to
their intrinsic proper�es and muses what that
might look like for humanity and mo�va�on:
tue of their intrinsic proper�es. A vase, for instan-
ce, is disposed to sha�er in the event of being
struck by a blunt instrument in virtue of the vase’s
atomic or molecular structure. This intrinsic pro-
perty of an object is commonly known as the cate-
gorical basis for the way an object is disposed to be-
have. Now, human beings too are disposed to be-
have in certain ways when certain circumstances
obtain, some�mes in beneficial and wonderful
ways, other �mes in harmful and terrible ways. But
if objects in general are disposed to behave in the
ways they do in virtue of certain intrinsic proper�es
of theirs, then the same must be true of human
beings specifically. So the ques�on arises: what in
the case of ourselves might serve as a categorical
basis for the different ways we are disposed to be-
have?” (Whi�ng, 2020, p. 3).
If what Whi�ng claims is true, a search for these in-
trinsic proper�es would be worthwhile. Whi�ng
does go on to develop the idea that these proper-
�es are not to be found in either desires or beliefs,
but in emo�ons (2020, See also McClelland, 1987 &
2020).
While Whi�ng’s arguments are compelling, they
fail to address the fact that emo�ons themselves
seem to be deriva�ve. We will seek to understand