Page 29 - EMCAPP-Journal No. 5

Empirical steps toward a Christian Psychology

Kevin Eames (USA)
Comment

to „Christian Psychology, Incommensurable
Rationalities, and the Critical Role of Empirical
Research“

Proposing a Fourth Level to the Christian
Model of Rationality:
A Response to P. J. Watson

Dr. Watson has presented a compelling mo- Kevin J. Eames, PhD is professor
del for understanding how a Christian psy- of psychology, department chair,
chology that values empirical research may and director of institutional effec-
project its voice among a Babel of rationalities tiveness at Covenant College in
(Watson, 2014). I was particularly intrigued Lookout Mountain, Georgia, in the
by MacIntyre’s (1988, cited in Watson, 2014) United States. Also adjunct profes-
definition of incommensurable rationalities as sor at Richmont Graduate Univer-
those that are calibrated to different standards. sity. PhD in Counseling Psycholo-
This notion of incommensurability is also part gy. Primary research interests in-
of Kuhn’s hypotheses involving the structure of clude the cognitive science of reli-
scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 1970). However, gion and the articulation of models
the two definitions appear to address two se- of Christian psychology.
parate concerns. For MacIntyre, the concern is
an incommensurability of metaphysics, specifi-
cally as it relates to theism and naturalism; for
Kuhn, the concern is an incommensurability of involves “the current understanding of its own
epistemology, specifically a scientific one. The standard” (2014, this issue). I would argue that
former, a metaphysical understanding must be at the fourth level, which sits atop the standard,
reconciled before that latter. If theism and spe- is the meta-standard. While different systems of
cial revelation are rejected as incompatible with rationality may differ from one another, there
the metaphysics of naturalism, then an episte- are incontrovertible similarities. For example,
mology that relies on positivistic explanations few systems of rationality would disagree on
for phenomena is the only rational approach. simple mathematical truths, or that our sense
Any supernatural explanation is a priori rejec- faculties are generally trustworthy, or that me-
ted, even if there are no satisfying natural expla- mories of very recent events are generally trust-
nations for phenomena. worthy – both of which are examples of axio-
matic truths for Thomas Reid, founder of the
Yet, although there may be incompatibilities Scottish Common Sense school of philosophy.
among the metaphysical and epistemological More specifically, this meta-standard also con-
approaches to phenomena, there is the tacit ac- tains what John Calvin described as the sensus
ceptance that, despite these incommensurate divinitatus. In the Institutes of the Christian Re-
differences, communication can take place, rea- ligion, Calvin argued that “there is within the
lity can be commonly discerned by a cognitive human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an
faculties that are generally trustworthy (Plan- awareness of divinity” (1559/1960, p. 43), with
tinga, 2011), and meaning can be shared. There which all humans are equipped. For Plantinga
appears to exist a fourth level in Dr. Watson’s (2000) this sensus divinitatus is a “faculty or co-
three-level model (standard, perspectives, and gnitive mechanism… which in a wide variety
meta-perspective). The standard refers to the of circumstances produces in us beliefs about
uppermost level of a rational paradigm which God” (p. 172).

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