Page 47 - EMCAPP-Journal No. 5
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Church Traditions for a Christian Psychology



             tity, is a distinctly human capacity (Thompson,   as a rule either a positive or a negative colou-
             2010, p. 74).  The human brain is also inherently   ring, contain, so to speak, either a positive or a
             relational; we are created for relationship.      negative charge. A positive charge is pleasure,
             For  example,  relational  neurobiology  has  lo-  and a negative charge is pain [emphasis added].
             calized  specific  capacities  for  facial  recogniti-  (p. 32)
             on  (Hasson,  Nir,  Levy,  Fuhrmann,  &  Malach,   Wojtyła  (1969/1979)  recognized  a  particular
             2004), imitation and understanding of the ac-     depth and richness in human emotion, distin-
             tions of others (“mirror neurons”; Rizzolatti &   guishing three levels of emotional experience:
             Craighero, 2004), and language (in Wernicke’s     sensual  “excitability,”  “emotional  stirring,”
             area in the temporal lobe and Broca’s area in the   and deep “passions of the soul” (pp. 237-239),
             frontal lobe).                                    further described as follows: Pleasure appears
             Human  cognition  is  personal,  disclosing  the   in different guises or shades—depending on the
             person.    In  what  may  represent  the  most  pe-  emotional-affective  experiences  with  which  it
             netrating solution yet proposed for the mind-     is connected.  It may be either sensual satisfac-
             body  problem,  Wojtyła  (1969/1979)  rejects     tion, or emotional contentment, or a profound,
             materialism and idealism, blending Thomistic      a total joy.  Pain also depends on the character
             metaphysics and a realist phenomenology.  He      of  the  emotional-affective  experiences  which
             appears  to  describe  three  aspects  or  levels  of   have caused it and appears in many forms, va-
             human consciousness:  cognition or “cognitive     rieties and nuances: as sensual disgust, or emo-
             acts”  (involving  phenomenological  intentio-    tional discontent, or a deep sadness. (Wojtyła,
             nality, p. 32), “reflecting consciousness” (“mir-  1960/1981, p. 32).
             roring  and  illuminating  functions,”  including
             “self-knowledge”  or  “self-understanding,”  pp.   Volitional and Moral
             32-34, 41, 49), and “reflexive…consciousness”     Catholic psychology is a volitional psychology
             (involving  “self-consciousness”  or  “self-expe-  and  a  moral  psychology.  Will  and  conscience
             rience,” pp. 43-50; see Wojtyła, 1969/1979, pp.   are core constitutive components of the struc-
             28-50;  Schmitz, 1993, pp. 63-77). “We then dis-  ture of the human person.
             cern clearly that it is one thing to be the subject,   Catholic psychology is a volitional psychology,
             another to be cognized (that is, objectivized) as   a psychology of will. “By virtue of his soul and
             the subject, and a still different thing to experi-  his spiritual powers of intellect and will, man
             ence one’s self as the subject of one’s own acts   is endowed with freedom, an ‘outstanding ma-
             and  experiences”  (Wojtyła,  1969/1979,  p.  44).   nifestation of the divine image’” (Catechism of
             Elegantly sidestepping both materialist epiphe-   the Catholic Church, n. 1705, citing Gaudium
             nomenalism and idealist subjectivism, the lived   et spes, n. 17). The will is free and personal. It is
             experience of person in action brought about by   informed by cognition or reason.  The human
             reflexive consciousness serves to unify human     will, as a property of the person, is the basis of
             interiority  and  exteriority,  subject  and  object,   “self-determination,” which includes self- pos-
             mind and matter, soul and body (Schmitz, 1993,    session  and  self-governance  (akin  to  Aqui-
             pp. 74-75).                                       nas’ rational appetite of will or volition): “The
             Human emotion is personal, an expression of       freedom appropriate to the human being, the
             the  person.    Consistent  with  Aquinas’  under-  person’s freedom resulting from the will, exhi-
             standing of the appetites as the soul’s relation-  bits itself as identical with self-determination,
             ship to corporeal objects as desirable or repug-  with that experiential, most complete, and fun-
             nant, attractive or repulsive (Brennan, 1941, p.   damental  organ  of  man’s  autonomous  being”
             246; Wojtyła, 1969/1979, pp. 234-236, 251-252),   (Wojtyła, 1969/1979, p. 115; cf. pp. 30-31, 116,
             Wojtyła (1960/1981) also appeared conversant      135).  The “fundamental structure” of “being a
             with  psychological  theories  recognizing  two   person”  [emphasis  added]  involves  self-deter-
             basic emotions of pleasure and pain: The emo-     mination,  “the  person’s  intrinsic  structure  of
             tional-affective overtones or states which are so   self-governance and self-possession” (Wojtyła,
             important a part of man’s entire inner life have   1969/1979, pp. 193-194).  Human freedom is an



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