Page 176 - EMCAPP-Journal No. 3

Forum

How can that be defended? Would not a strong theism tant to believe that God operates in all forms of therapy
necessarily assume that God is also active in the thera- and that his actions are not limited by the ideological
pies of strong non-theism, weak non-theism, and weak assumptions of therapists. Efforts to see God’s activity
theism? Again, the claim is, “Still, for a strong theist, the even in strong and weak non-theistic and weak theistic
explicit inclusion of God in the formulation and practice therapies may encourage a generosity and appreciation of
of therapy cannot help but facilitate effectiveness” (169). other perspectives that will help the “choir” sing and be
Can a strong theism assume that the actions of God are heard by wider audiences.
ever limited by the therapies of man? Would it not be
better to appreciate the potential role of God in all the-
rapies and then work hard to express that role within the
conceptual frameworks of a strong theism? Would not a
strong theism engaged in this kind of dialogue with other
perspectives be better able to express itself to other the-
isms and non-theisms within the marketplace of ideas?
Would this approach not be essential for any strong the-
ism that aspired to do more than just preach to the choir?

As a final example of a need for broader sensitivity, Slife
et al. argue, “Naturalism is itself a set of assumptions and
biases about which many clients, both theistic and non-
theistic, might not agree … For this reason, we believe it
is ethically imperative to identify the conceptual assump-
tions of all psychotherapies in order to provide clients
with the information needed to allow some type of infor-
med consent.” The need for informed consent certainly
makes sense from some perspectives. But questions do
nevertheless arise. Is “informed consent” a biblical con-
cept or a principle that emerges from a different world-
view? How can it be justified by a strong theism? Does
God of the Bible demand informed consent for his or his
disciple’s actions? And where does informed consent end
and how can its limits be defined in strongly theistic and
other worldview terms? For example, will it be necessary
to have informed consent about whether therapy is com-
patible with the assumptions of a politics of self-reliance
or a politics of communal care? Will it always be neces-
sary to make clear the therapist’s assumptions about fe-
minism, sexual orientation, nationalism, pacifism? And
even within the Christian community, will it be impor-
tant at the outset to spell out the therapist’s beliefs about,
for example, birth control, theology, denominations, etc.?
The “choir” may see the point of demanding informed
consent as a defense against the hegemony of ontologi-
cal naturalism. However, “informed consent” will have
important implications within and also outside the choir
that appear to demand a more thoughtful response by the
“preacher” of strong theism.
In summary, Slife et al. deserve great credit for encou-
raging Christian psychologists to take heart, to have the
courage of their conviction. The difficulties in their po-
sition me be less in what they say, than in what they do P. J. Watson, is U. C. Foundation Professor of
not say. The aspiration of their strong theism is to have Psychology at the University of Tennessee at
a broader impact in “the market of potential ideas and Chattanooga.
strategies” (p. 173). Within a pluralistic cultural context, paul-watson@utc.edu.
this description of strong theism may need to be supple-
mented by arguments that will speak more effectively to
perspectives outside the “choir.” When this is done, it may
even be necessary to modify how the strong theist choo-
ses to preach to the choir. For example, it may be impor-

176